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Abstract 
The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 is silent on the 
issue of dealing with evidence obtained through human rights 
violations. This silence dates to the earlier Constitutions of 1962, 
1966 and 1967. It is only the Prohibition and Prevention of 
Torture Act of 2012 that renders evidence obtained through 
torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
inadmissible. This means that evidence obtained through human 
rights violations other than torture and cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment is not covered by any other legislation in 
Uganda. The position is different in other jurisdictions such as 
South Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe, which have constitutional 
provisions on how to deal with evidence obtained through human 
rights violations. The decisions that have been handed down by 
the Ugandan courts reflect various jurisprudential 
inconsistencies in dealing with this kind of evidence. This study 
delves into this lacuna and suggests proposals for reform. 
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1 Introduction 
Uganda is a party to various international and regional instruments, which 
include the African Charter,1 the Convention against Torture2 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,3 which require it to deal 
appropriately with evidence obtained through human rights violations. There 
is, however, no domestic regulation of evidence obtained through human 
rights violations in Uganda. The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 
1995 is silent on the topic. This silence is also evident in the Constitutions 
of 1962, 1966 and 1967. In addition, the decisions handed down by the 
courts do not offer a consistent development of jurisprudence on the 
admission of evidence obtained through human rights violations. The 
situation regarding evidence obtained through human rights violations 
would be different if there were guidance from consistent case law, or a 
constitutional directive.  
When courts are faced with the question of the admission of evidence 
obtained through human rights violations, they may use the reliability 
principle, because improperly obtained evidence may be as reliable as 
lawfully obtained evidence and may have a bearing on the innocence or 
guilt of an accused.4 The courts may use the deterrent principle for the 
purpose of punishing a person who obtained the evidence improperly.5 
Alternatively, the courts may also follow the protective principle, whereby an 
accused does not suffer a disadvantage because of evidence obtained 
through human rights violations by investigators.6 
This article discusses the silence of the Constitution in comparison with the 
earlier Ugandan constitutions by looking at its drafting history and the 
wording of previous Constitutions in Uganda, and evaluating various 
criminal procedure laws. The purpose of doing so is to establish if there are 
any statutory provisions that deal with evidence obtained through human 
rights violations. Thereafter the article evaluates decisions handed down by 
                                            
* Robert D Nanima. LLB (Makerere University Kampala) LLM (University of the Western 
Cape) Dip LP (Law Development Centre, Kampala). PhD candidate, University of the 
Western Cape, South Africa. Email: rnanima@gmail.com. I acknowledge the input of 
Prof JD Mujuzi who supervised this work as part of my Masters’ study, Prof I Leeman 
who edited the drafts and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments. 
1  African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981), ratified 27 March 1986. 
2  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (1984), acceded 3 November 1986. 
3  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), acceded 21 June 1995. 
4  John and Sarah Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence 154. 
5  John and Sarah Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence 154-155. 
6  John and Sarah Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence 155. 
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the courts from 1995 to 2014, to establish whether there is a developed 
jurisprudence, the extent to which the jurisprudence is consistent, and 
whether there is justification for a constitutional amendment. The article 
provides a comparative study of South African law, because it has a 
constitutional provision on how to deal with evidence obtained through 
human rights violations. This is coupled with a discussion of the most recent 
trends in case law, to justify the need for reform. A conclusion and 
recommendations follow. 
The Constitution is silent on the issue of dealing with evidence obtained 
through human rights violations. It provides that:  
(1) Fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual are inherent and not 
granted by the State. 
(2) The rights and freedoms of the individual and groups enshrined in this 
Chapter shall be respected, upheld and promoted by all organs and 
agencies of Government and by all persons.7 
This Article guarantees rights for all individuals in Uganda by virtue of their 
nature as human beings. In addition, any person who claims that a 
fundamental or other right or freedom has been infringed or threatened may 
apply to a competent court for redress.8 While these provisions guarantee 
rights and offer enforcement, they do not provide a directive on how to deal 
with evidence obtained through human rights violations. It would be 
desirable that constitutional rights which are violated in the course of 
gathering evidence should be subjected to a directive on how to deal with 
evidence so gathered. Some of these rights include the right to a fair trial,9 
the presumption of innocence until proven guilty,10 and the right to be 
charged in accordance with the law.11 Other rights are the rights to privacy,12 
personal liberty,13 and against self-incrimination.14 Some of the pre-trial 
guarantees for an accused person include a presumption of innocence until 
he or she is proved or pleads guilty;15 the right to be informed immediately 
in a language that the person understands of the nature of the offence;16 
and the provision of adequate time and facilities to prepare his or her 
                                            
7  Article 20 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 (the Constitution). 
8  Article 20 of the Constitution. 
9  Article 28 of the Constitution 
10  Article 28(3)(a) of the Constitution 
11  Article 28(7) of the Constitution 
12  Article 27 of the Constitution 
13  Article 23 of the Constitution 
14  Article 28(11) of the Constitution 
15  Article 28(3)(a) of the Constitution 
16  Article 28(3)(b) of the Constitution 
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defence.17 These pre-trial guarantees do not, however, provide for a remedy 
where evidence has been obtained through human rights violations. The 
relief provided by the Constitution relates to an application for redress for 
the infringement of a human right and not evidence obtained through human 
rights violations.18 Other jurisdictions such as South Africa,19 Canada,20 
Zimbabwe21 and Kenya22 have constitutional provisions on how to deal with 
this evidence. Hong Kong lacks a constitutional provision but it has 
developed consistent case law which deals with evidence obtained through 
human rights violations.23 It may be concluded from these instances that 
there is need for a developed, consistent jurisprudence with regard to 
evidence obtained through human rights violations. The consistency may 
be by way of statutory provision or case law. This study sets out to establish 
if there is any statutory provision in Uganda dealing with evidence obtained 
through human rights violations. Thereafter, an analysis of case law from 
the Supreme Court is done. An evaluation of the South African approach is 
done to show why it is inevitable to have a developed jurisprudence. 
Thereafter the author draws from the existing jurisprudence to justify the 
need for reform. 
2 Drafting history of the Constitutions of Uganda 
Uganda has had a turbulent constitutional history, with four Constitutions 
since independence.24 A look at the drafting history of the four Constitutions 
gives an insight into the silence of the Constitution on how to deal with 
evidence obtained through human rights violations. The Constitution, 1962 
referred to as the Independence Constitution, was drafted in London by the 
British, as the colonial masters.25 An examination of the broader context 
within which it was drafted reveals that it was more of a political Constitution 
geared at creating a balance of interests between political factions in 
                                            
17  Article 28(3)(c) of the Constitution 
18  Article 50(1) of the Constitution provides that "Any person who claims that a 
fundamental or other right or freedom guaranteed under this Constitution has been 
infringed or threatened, is entitled to apply to a competent court for redress which may 
include compensation". 
19  Section 35(5) of Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
20  Section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
1982. 
21  Section 70(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 2013. 
22  Article 50(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, 2010. 
23  HKSAR v Muhammad Riaz Khan 2012 HKFCA 38 (Khan). See Mujuzi 2012 IJEP 425-
430. 
24  Constitutions of the Republic of Uganda, 1962, 1966, 1967 and 1995. See 
Wapakhabulo "Managing the Constitution" 114-131. 
25  Wapakhabulo "Managing the Constitution" 24 114. 
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Uganda.26 While it had a Bill of Rights, it did not have a provision relating to 
the status of evidence obtained through human rights violations.27 The 
suspension of the Constitution, 1962 was as a result of the constitutional 
crisis of 1966, which led to the "pigeon-hole"28 Constitution of 1966 and the 
subsequent Constitution of 1967 (Constitution, 1967).29 The Constitution, 
1967, just like the earlier two versions, had a Bill of Rights, but did not have 
a provision relating to evidence obtained through human rights violations.30 
This was partly because the broader context in which the Constitution was 
drafted required that it meet particular political ends. A discussion of this 
issue would be beyond the scope of this article.31 
The final Constitution of 1995 was largely based on the recommendations 
of the Report of the Uganda Constitutional Commission (Odoki Commission 
Report).32 This Report did not specifically deal with evidence obtained 
through human rights violations. It provided for the rights most frequently 
violated in Uganda's history,33 and recommended respect for the rights to 
personal liberty34 and a fair trial,35 among others. The Report provided for 
the enforcement of rights in the draft Constitution,36 and recommended the 
establishment of the Uganda Human Rights Commission to exercise quasi-
judicial powers in the investigation and enforcement of human rights 
issues.37 The functions given to the Uganda Human Rights Commission, 
however, did not include a directive on how to deal with evidence obtained 
through human rights violations. In the author's view, the Uganda Human 
                                            
26  Wapakhabulo "Managing the Constitution" 114. 
27  Tripp "Politics of Constitution Making" 159. 
28  Prepared and passed by the then Prime Minister, Dr. Apollo Milton Obote, without 
debate on 15 April 1966, clipping the powers of the President and vesting executive 
power in the prime minister. The Constitution was then placed in the pigeon-holes of 
members of parliament at the parliamentary buildings.  
29  Tripp "Politics of Constitution Making" 160. 
30  Tripp "Politics of Constitution Making" 160. 
31  Furley and Katalikawe 1997 African Affairs 261; Barya Making of Uganda's 1995 
Constitution 42-46; Mutiibwa Uganda since Independence 58. 
32  The Report of the Uganda Constitutional Commission, 1992 (Odoki Commission 
Report). The Odoki Commission was appointed in accordance with the Constitutional 
Commission Statute 5 of 1988. 
33  Odoki Commission Report 146-147, paras 7.52-7.60. 
34  Odoki Commission Report 180, para 7.153. See art 35 of the draft Constitution of 
1995, 764. 
35  Odoki Commission Report 181-183, paras 7.152-7.169. See art 37 of the draft 
Constitution of 1995, 765. 
36  Odoki Commission Report Appendix 1. 
37  Odoki Commission Report 186-188, paras 7.178-7.181. See arts 42-43 of the draft 
Constitution of 1995, 767. 
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Rights Commission was not accorded the status of a court of record,38 
because it is not a judicial body. 
When the draft Constitution was presented to the Constituent Assembly for 
debate, the delegates acknowledged two issues that were instructive for the 
final outcome of the debate: first, that the aim of the Bill of Rights was to 
enhance the protection, promotion and enjoyment of human rights,39 and 
second, that since Uganda was a signatory to many international 
instruments, its commitment would be judged by the manner in which the 
Constitution provided safeguards to avoid a violation of human rights in the 
country.40 The Constituent Assembly, however, throughout the debates on 
the Bill of Rights, did not debate the issue of a directive regarding evidence 
obtained through human rights violations. The debates focused to a great 
extent on the recommendations of the Odoki Commission.41 The drafting 
history shows that the omission of a constitutional directive by the drafters 
was not by design. This significant directive, which was omitted, could easily 
have been corrected through an amendment to the Constitution or by 
enacting legislation to complement the Constitution. In addition, the judiciary 
could have developed a consistent jurisprudence through case law to 
remedy the default. At the time of writing this article, neither has Parliament 
amended the Constitution nor has the judiciary developed a consistent 
jurisprudence on how to deal with evidence obtained through human rights 
violations.  
3 Analysis of legislation 
The current pieces of legislation do not adequately provide for a mode of 
dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations. The 
Prohibition and Prevention of Torture Act42 has a provision which is limited 
to evidence obtained through torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment (CIDT). Section 14(1) thereof provides: 
Any information, confession or admission obtained from a person by means of 
torture is inadmissible in evidence against that person in any proceedings.43 
                                            
38  Article 129 of the Constitution. 
39  Submission of Hon Cecil Ogwal in the Report of the Proceedings of Constituent 
Assembly, 1994 (CA Proceedings Report) 1809. 
40  Submission of Hon Cecil Ogwal, Report of the Proceedings of Constituent Assembly, 
1994 (CA Proceedings Report) 1809. 
41  Report of the Proceedings of Constituent Assembly, 1994 (CA Proceedings Report), 
generally dated 31 August 1994. 
42  Prohibition and Prevention of Torture Act 3 of 2012. 
43  Section 14 of the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture Act 3 of 2012. 
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This section limits its operation to evidence obtained through torture and 
CIDT.44 Its effectiveness is also curtailed by the nature of the evidence that 
can be admitted under section 14. This evidence includes information, 
confessions or admissions.45 While confessions and admissions are 
provided for in the Evidence Act,46 information is not provided for. This 
means that while evidence with regard to confessions and admissions may 
be dealt with under the Evidence Act, evidence with regard to information 
obtained as a result of torture and CIDT is not covered by the Prevention 
and Prohibition of Torture Act.47 
The Evidence Act48 places emphasis on the admissibility of confessions, 
which is one form of evidence that is susceptible to human rights 
violations.49 Other forms of evidence that may be susceptible to human 
rights violations include evidence arising from illegal searches,50 such as 
autoptic evidence51 and vigilante evidence,52 are not covered by the 
legislation.53 Autoptic evidence refers to passive evidence such as the 
suspect's complexion, stature, marks or features, which may be admitted as 
evidence that incriminates the accused.54 Vigilante evidence, on the other 
hand, refers to evidence that has been obtained by third parties, like private 
security officers55 or private persons56 other than the police.  
The Evidence Act regulates the relevance and admissibility of evidence in 
courts and provides guidelines for the recording of confessions.57 It provides 
that a confession which would otherwise be inadmissible may still be 
admitted in evidence, if in the view of the court the impression making it 
inadmissible is removed.58 The court therefore exercises a discretion either 
                                            
44  Sections 7, 14 of the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture Act 3 of 2012. Mujuzi 2012 
IHRLR 389. While the wording is limited to torture, the law also covers cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment. 
45  Section 14 of the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture Act 3 of 2012; Mujuzi 2012 
IHRLR 387. 
46  Evidence Act, Cap 6 (Laws of Uganda) (the Evidence Act) - see Part II thereof. 
47  Mujuzi 2012 IHRLR 382-394 generally. 
48  Evidence Act, Cap 6 (Laws of Uganda). 
49  Sections 23-27 of the Evidence Act. 
50  Zeffert and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 711. 
51  De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights Handbook 658. 
52  De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights Handbook 658. 
53  De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights Handbook 658. 
54  Du Toit Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 3–1-3–32C. 
55  S v Songezo Mini (unreported) case number 141178/2015 of 30 April 2015 paras 20, 
21, 22. 
56  S v Hena 2006 2 SACR 33 (SE) 40i-41b. 
57  Sections 24-26 of the Evidence Act. 
58  Section 25 of the Evidence Act. 
RD NANIMA  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  8 
to admit or not to admit the evidence.59 Section 24 of the Evidence Act 
provides:  
A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant if the making of the 
confession appears to the court, having regard to the state of mind of the 
accused person and to all the circumstances, to have been caused by any 
violence, force, threat, inducement or promise calculated in the opinion of the 
court to cause an untrue confession to be made.60 
According to the section, if the judicial officer is of the view that the 
confession was not obtained voluntarily on account of the use of violence or 
force, a threat or any form of inducement, the confession shall no longer be 
relevant. Evidence which would otherwise have been inadmissible by the 
operation of section 24 becomes admissible only after the court has 
satisfied itself that the confession was obtained voluntarily. 
The Criminal Procedure Code Act61 provides for the mode of arrest and 
search of an accused person.62 This Act is also silent on how to deal with 
evidence obtained through human rights violations, such as illegal arrests 
and searches. The Magistrates Courts Act63 and the Trial on Indictments 
Act64 are equally silent on how to handle evidence obtained through human 
rights violations. The silence in all these laws shows that there is no 
statutory provision that adequately deals with evidence obtained through 
human rights violations. 
The Regulation of Interception of Communications Act65 allows authorised 
persons from security organisations to obtain a warrant from a designated 
judge to intercept communications.66 In instances where the holder of the 
warrant exceeds the bounds of the warrant, the Act still sanctions the 
admission of such evidence obtained, with due regard to the circumstances 
in which the evidence was obtained. Some of the circumstances include the 
potential effect of its admission or exclusion on issues of national security, 
and the unfairness to the accused that may be occasioned by its admission 
or exclusion.67 This puts individuals at the mercy of state organs. The literal 
                                            
59  Section 25 of the Evidence Act. 
60  Section 24 of the Evidence Act. 
61  Criminal Procedure Code Act, Cap 116 (Laws of Uganda) (the Criminal Procedure 
Code Act). 
62  Sections 2-27 of the Criminal Procedure Code Act. 
63  Magistrates Courts Act, Cap 16 (Laws of Uganda). 
64  Trial on Indictment Act, Cap 23 (Laws of Uganda). 
65  Regulation of Interceptions of Communications Act 18 of 2010 (the Interceptions of 
Communications Act). 
66  Section 4 of the Interceptions of Communications Act. 
67  Sections 7(a)-(c) of the Interceptions of Communications Act. 
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interpretation of the Act is that where there is a violation of the rights of an 
individual, the evidence may still be admitted on the grounds of national 
security. 
While the Constitution is silent, legislation that governs criminal justice has 
done little to solve the issue of dealing with evidence obtained through 
human rights violations. Most of the legislation has not been amended since 
the passing of the Constitution in 1995.68 Therefore the silence of the 
Constitution is exacerbated by the inadequate ability of the existing 
legislation to complement it in dealing with evidence obtained through 
human rights violations.  
4 Analysis of case law 
The courts have handed down different decisions on how to deal with 
evidence obtained through human rights violations. An analysis of these 
decisions helps us establish how the courts have dealt with this evidence, 
and what can be done to improve the situation. In Namulobi Hasadi v 
Uganda (Namulobi),69 the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court on five 
grounds:70 first, that the confession had been repudiated in the course of 
the trial;71 second, that the confession had been improperly recorded since 
the appellant had not signed it;72 third, that the apparent insertion of the 
name of a detective was evidence of a pre-written statement rather than a 
voluntary statement;73 fourth, that the confession had been obtained as a 
result of torture;74 and last, the confession had been recorded after the 
accused had spent a week in custody75 beyond the mandatory 48 hours as 
determined by the Constitution.76 
The Court upheld the admission of the confession in evidence on the ground 
that it did not occasion any injustice to the appellant.77 With regard to the 
irregular recording of the confession, the Court stated that although the 
                                            
68  The Criminal Procedure Code Act, Magistrates Courts Act, and Trial on Indictment Act 
do not contain any substantive amendments made since 1995 to deal with evidence 
obtained through human rights violations. 
69  Namulobi Hasadi v Uganda (unreported) case number 16/1997 of 13 July 1998 
(Namulobi). 
70  While the Memorandum of Appeal has four grounds, the record shows there were five 
grounds that were determined by the Supreme Court. 
71  Namulobi 3. 
72  Namulobi 3. 
73  Namulobi 3. 
74  Namulobi 3. 
75  Namulobi 3. 
76  Article 28 of the Constitution. 
77  Namulobi 4-11. 
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recording of the confession took place in a room occupied by other people, 
these people were busy about their own duties.78 The Court recognised the 
fact that the police do not usually have enough rooms for a recording officer 
to be alone with an accused,79 and that the appellant had never complained 
about an irregularity in the mode of recording the confession.80 In addition, 
the law that the appellant relied on to claim that the recording of the 
confession was in a language he did not understand had been repealed.81 
With regard to the allegation that the appellant had been tortured before the 
confession was recorded, the Court relied on the evidence of another 
accused person who had been arrested and detained with the appellant. 82 
This person had stated that the appellant had not been tortured, which he 
knew since they had been in the same police cell for the entire week, from 
the time of arrest.83 The Court noted that there was evidence other than the 
confession which would sustain the conviction of the appellant. This 
included corroborative evidence such as informal confessions made by the 
accused to the witnesses for the prosecution, and evidence of the 
appellant's volunteering to give information to the police, which evidence 
had led to the recovery of items the belonging to the victim.84  
It is clear that obtaining the confession after the accused had been in 
custody beyond the mandatory 48 hours was a violation of the appellant's 
right to liberty.85 In admitting this evidence, the Court was setting a 
precedent that permitted for disregard of the rules governing the recording 
of confessions and that aided the voluntary recording of a confession. The 
Court seemed to state that provided the illegal presence of other people in 
a room where a confession was recorded did not directly interfere with the 
recording of the confession, the Court would admit it. In addition, if the 
confession was corroborated, the Court would admit it. The rationale of the 
case was based on the reliability theory and to admit the confession on the 
basis of its probative value, instead of deterring the police from using illegal 
methods in obtaining the evidence. By upholding the confession, the Court 
condoned the illegal actions of the police86 and went against its own 
                                            
78  Namulobi 4. 
79  Namulobi 4. 
80  Namulobi 4. 
81  Repealed by the Evidence (Amendment) Decree No. 25 of 1971. 
82  Namulobi 4. 
83  Namulobi 4. 
84  Namulobi 8. 
85  Namulobi 8. 
86  To read more on the condonation rationale, see Milhizer 2012 Mil L Rev 239. See also 
R v Collins 1987 1 SCR 265 para 45. 
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principle that required that it not uphold an illegality once it was brought to 
its attention.87 
In Uganda v Kalawudio Wamala (Kalawudio),88 the accused was indicted 
for the offence of rape.89 The prosecution sought to tender an exculpatory 
statement made by the accused person.90Just as in Namulobi, the 
statement in Kalawudio was made after the accused had been in custody 
beyond the mandatory 48 hours.91 The High Court declined to admit the 
statement because it was made after the accused had been in custody for 
10 days, which exceeded the statutory 48 hours.92 Secondly, the statement 
was recorded contrary to the rules in the Evidence (Statement to Police 
Officers) Rules.93 The rule referred to states: 
If a police officer decides that the statement of any person should be taken 
down in writing and is likely to be tendered in evidence in any proceedings, 
then - (a) if there is present any police officer literate in the language being 
used by such person, the police officer literate in such language shall write 
down the statement as nearly possible in the actual words used by the person 
making the statement … .94 
The Court noted that while the accused could speak the Luganda dialect, 
the police officer recorded the confession in English. The Court stated that 
the conduct of the police officer was contrary to this Rule.95 The other 
reasons that the court gave for not admitting the exculpatory statement were 
that it protected the accused, that the court had to uphold the public interest, 
and that it had to deter persons and organs of government from condoning 
a breach of human rights.96 In addition, the admission of the confession 
would be against the tenets of the right to a fair trial.97 This was instructive 
of the Court's willingness to develop case law on the exclusionary rule. It 
must be noted that the Court declined to admit the evidence because the 
statement had not been recorded in accordance with the Evidence 
(Statements to Police Officer's) Rules. These Rules had been declared by 
                                            
87  Makula International v Emmanuel Nsubuga 1982 HCB 11. See also Francis Mpamizo 
v Uganda 2011 UGHC 30 (18 March 2011) 4. 
88  Uganda v Kalawudio Wamala (unreported) case number 442/1996 of 6 November 
1996 (Kalawudio). 
89  Sections 117, 118 of the Penal Code Act, Cap 120 (Laws of Uganda). 
90  Kalawudio para 19. 
91  Kalawudio paras 1, 19.  
92  Kalawudio para 22. 
93  Kalawudio paras 22-24. These Rules were declared annulled by the repeal of s 24 of 
the Evidence Act. 
94  Rule 7(a) reproduced in Kalawudio para 23. 
95  Kalawudio paras 22-23 
96  Kalawudio para 28. 
97  Kalawudio paras 31-33. 
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the Supreme Court in Namulobi, to have been annulled by the repeal of 
section 24 of the Evidence Act.98 Although the Court had not relied on Rule 
7(a) to arrive at its decision, it made it clear that the statement was illegal 
because it had been recorded after the accused had been in police custody 
for more than the mandated 48 hours.99 The illegal procuring of a statement 
from an accused for use against him at trial was found to be repugnant to 
the values and standards set out in the new Constitution (as it then was), 
and that the Court would not be complying with its duty if it admitted the 
statement and permitted the wrongful and unconstitutional conduct of the 
police or any other organ in its investigation of crime.100 The Court took a 
cautious stand not to condone the improper excesses of the police, and 
used the protective theory to ensure that the accused did not suffer a 
disadvantage because of evidence obtained through human rights 
violations by the police.101 This case illustrated a shift of the jurisprudence 
from the admission to the non-admission of evidence obtained through 
human rights violations. 
In Ssewankambo Francis, Kiwanuka Paul, Mutaya Muzairu v Uganda 
(Ssewankambo),102 the three appellants were convicted by the High Court 
of simple robbery.103 The first and second appellants were arrested on the 
same day, and upon interrogation by the police they named the third 
appellant as a person who took part in the robbery.104 The third appellant 
was subsequently arrested. All three appellants made confessions, giving 
detailed accounts of the parts they had played in the robbery. The 
appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming that the judges of the 
Court of Appeal erred in law when they admitted the confessions.105 They 
asserted that the Court had not inquired from the defence as to whether it 
had any objection to the admission of the confessions, and a failure to do 
so on the part of the judge was a failure of justice.106 The Court held that it 
was improper to admit the confessions.107 This was because the trial judge 
had not given the defence (the appellants) an opportunity to say anything 
about the confessions before they were admitted.108 The court re-
                                            
98  Namulobi para 5. 
99  Kalawudio paras 1, 19. 
100  Kalawudio para 26. 
101  John and Sarah Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence 154-155. 
102  Ssewankambo Francis, Kiwanuka Paul, Mutaya Muzairu v Uganda (unreported) case 
number 33/2001 of 20 February 2003 (Ssewankambo). 
103  Ssewankambo 1. 
104  Ssewankambo 2. 
105  Ssewankambo 4. 
106  Ssewankambo 4. 
107  Ssewankambo 8. 
108  Ssewankambo 8. 
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enunciated the principle that it is improper to admit a confession without 
subjecting it to a trial-within-a-trial.109 This was so because in Article 28(3)a 
the Constitution provided for the right to the presumption of innocence that 
required that  
… where in a criminal trial, an accused has pleaded not guilty, the trial court 
must be cautious before admitting in evidence a confession statement 
allegedly made by an accused person prior to his trial.110 
The Court stated further that  
… it is not proper or safe to admit a confession statement in evidence on the 
ground that counsel for the accused has not challenged or conceded to its 
admissibility. Unless the trial court ascertains from the accused that he or she 
admits having made the confession statement voluntarily, the court ought to 
hold the trial-within-a-trial to determine its admissibility.111 
In this case the Court upheld the rights to the presumption of innocence and 
against self- incrimination, where a confession was not subjected to the 
process of testing the voluntariness of the accused in making it.112 The 
Court also noted some irregularities in the recording of the confessions.113 
First, the confessions of the first and second appellants had been recorded 
by the same officer, and this could have led him to be tempted to use the 
contents of the first statement in the second.114 Second, a police officer who 
did not adequately understand the language of the appellants had not used 
an interpreter for the recording of the confession.115 Third, the appellants 
claimed to have been assaulted by the police before their statements were 
recorded, yet no medical evidence was adduced to rebut this claim.116  
The decision served a triple purpose. It enhanced the presumption of 
innocence, and buttressed the need for the procedure of a trial-within-a-trial 
to ascertain the voluntariness of the making of the confession. It also upheld 
the right against self-incrimination of an accused from an adjudication 
perspective. This decision buttressed the duty of courts to ensure that they 
do not provide an enabling environment for self-incrimination by the 
accused.117 The case also illustrated the move by the courts from a reliability 
perspective to a protective perspective in an attempt to protect the accused 
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person from human rights violations by the police in the procurement of 
evidence. 
In Walugembe Henry, Ssali Paul Sande and Kamanzi Joseph v Uganda 
(Walugembe),118 the first, second and third accused were indicted and 
convicted of three counts of robbery. Some of the facts on which their 
convictions were based were that the third appellant had told the police that 
they had gone to a certain swamp, where they had hidden goods they had 
stolen earlier on.119 He had led the police to the scene and items, including 
a television and a video deck, had been recovered. In the course of their 
defence, all the appellants repudiated the confessions they had made to the 
police.120 A confession is considered to be repudiated when the accused 
person acknowledges that although he made it, it was made involuntarily.121 
Where a confession is made involuntarily and the state seeks to tender the 
said confession in evidence, the rights of an accused against self-
incrimination and to a presumption of innocence are violated. It is therefore 
proper that the Court satisfies itself that a confession was obtained 
voluntarily before it is admitted in evidence. The first and second appellants 
averred that the confessions had been obtained through torture;122 that the 
recording of the statements had been irregular because they were recorded 
in English and not in the languages the appellants understood;123 and that 
the confessions had been recorded by the same police officer.124 It was also 
noted that the confession of the second appellant had been recorded in the 
presence of the officer in charge of the police station. The Court held that it 
was a misdirection to admit the confessions in the light of the irregularities 
in recording them. The rationale for this holding was that the confessions 
had not been meticulously tested as regards the voluntariness of their 
making.125 The Court stated that it was prudent to establish the onus of proof 
and consider the irregular recording of the confessions.126 In instances 
where the accused challenged the admissibility of a confession, the trial 
court was duty bound to have it proved in a trial-within-a-trial that the 
confessions had been made voluntarily.127 The Court agreed with the 
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principle in Ssewankambo that it is not proper for a police officer to record 
statements from two accused persons in a single case that he is 
investigating.128 In this case, the Court used the protective theory as a basis 
for the holding. In addition, the Court made it clear that the right procedure 
ought to be followed in recording confessions, which required that an 
investigating officer would not record the confessions of two accused 
persons in the same case before him.129 The Court did not, however, 
pronounce itself on the standard of proof. It did by implication validate the 
decision in Kalawudio. 
In Kizza Besigye v the Attorney General,130 the applicants were re-arrested 
and detained illegally after the High Court granted them bail.131 While this 
case did not involve the admission of evidence obtained through human 
rights violations, it involved the continued prosecution of accused persons 
in disregard of their rights to liberty during trial.132 The Court reiterated that 
the applicants had the constitutional rights to be tried before an independent 
and impartial body, to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and to apply 
for bail.133 Other rights included the right to protection from torture and CIDT, 
and a fair hearing.134 On the basis of these facts, and with reference to 
persuasive decisions on the right to a fair trial from other jurisdictions,135 the 
Court stated that it could not sanction the continued prosecution of the 
petitioners where during the proceedings their human rights had been 
violated.136 The right to a fair trial referred to was based on the interruption 
of the court's adjudicating a criminal case, and not on the violation of rights 
during the collection of evidence. While the Court was of the view that the 
continued detention of the accused persons would have been a violation of 
their rights to liberty and security of person, it did not address this issue. 
That could be partly because the accused raised the grounds but failed to 
substantiate them.137 The principles in this case are very instrumental in 
relaying the need for law enforcement agencies to respect human rights in 
the course of investigating a crime and during a trial. In addition, the Court 
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reiterated its duty to enforce the provisions of the Constitution, regardless 
of how strong the evidence against the accused person was.138 The Court 
suggested that the yardstick was whether a fair trial would be achieved, 
depending on the circumstances of each case. If the trial would be a waste 
of time and an abuse of the court process, then it would not be fair.139 The 
Court's view that a prosecution instituted in breach of the law is a violation 
of the rights of the accused was instrumental in the continued development 
of the jurisprudence regarding evidence obtained through human rights 
violations. 
In Uganda v Robert Ssekabira,140 the eleven accused persons were 
arrested and detained, and then charged eleven days later.141 Before they 
were charged the accused had been in police custody without charge. This 
was contrary to the right to be promptly informed upon their arrest of the 
charges against them.142 It is important to note that the police and the 
prosecutors had to ensure that the consent of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions was obtained before charging anyone under the Anti-terrorism 
Act.143 Although the failure to get consent was not a human rights violation, 
it would amount to an impropriety on the part of the police or the prosecutor. 
It would be expected that the prosecutor, as an officer of the court, would 
adequately guide it with regard to all the administrative requirements that 
had to be complied with before the accused persons were brought before it. 
Therefore the evidence that had been procured after the initial 48 hours of 
their detention had been obtained in violation of their right to liberty.144 The 
prosecution conceded to the violations of the right to a fair trial since the 
accused had been remanded beyond 48 hours;145 however, it requested the 
Court to take into account the circumstances that led to the violation of the 
Constitution.146 The major issue before the Court was whether in the light of 
the constitutional violations there was any statutory authority or case law 
that granted the Court the power to excuse the breach of a constitutional 
provision.147 The Court found that there was no such authority and held that 
improper evidence or evidence obtained through human rights violations 
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should not be admitted if it affected an accused's right to a fair trial. The 
rationale for this holding was that the Constitutional Court had in Besigye 
decided that it could not sanction any continued prosecution of the 
petitioners where during the proceedings their human rights had been 
grossly violated.148 Secondly, the Constitution had set a new threshold for 
all organs and agencies of government to be mindful of the duty to guard it 
from violation by agents of the state.149 The trend was intended to ensure 
that evidence obtained through human rights violations was not tendered. 
The protection sought by the Court was not provided for in the Constitution, 
because it lacked provisions on evidence obtained through human rights 
violations and what constituted justifiable limitations on the rights of an 
accused person. If there had been a constitutional directive with regard to 
evidence obtained through human rights violations, the Court would have 
dealt with the specifics of the violation in the light of the constitutional 
directive. In addition, the Court would have made a more nuanced decision 
as regards what would constitute a justifiable limitation of the enjoyment of 
human rights in a constitutional dispensation.150 While the Court noted the 
failure of the prosecution to guide it,151 it did not use this opportunity to clarify 
the role of prosecutors in guiding a court in instances where they had 
knowledge of the obtaining of evidence in violation of the petitioners' 
rights.152 The Court opted to use the protective principle in dealing with 
evidence obtained through human rights violations, whereby it sought to 
protect the accused persons from the procedural excesses of the 
investigating officers.153 
In Uganda v Ekungu Simon (Ekungu),154 the state appealed against the 
decision of a Magistrate to acquit the respondent on two counts of bribery.155 
The respondent had corruptly solicited a bribe from the complainant, who 
had informed the Office of the Inspectorate of Government about it. This 
Office had organised a trap and the respondent had been arrested after 
receiving the bribe.156 The High Court upheld the appeal on the basis of the 
fact that the Magistrate had not evaluated the evidence adequately and as 
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a result arrived at a wrong decision, and ordered that the case be retried 
before another Magistrate.157 This case is important for the present 
purposes because while the Court took issue with the evidence obtained 
through human rights violations, it did not offer any recommendations on 
how to deal with evidence obtained through entrapment. In this case, after 
the police had used a trap to arrest the respondent, they forced the 
respondent's colleagues in the office to sign the Search Certificate as 
witnesses to the recovery of the bribe from the office of the Respondent.158 
While Ekungu involved evidence of a search certificate corroborating the 
evidence of recovery of the bribe from the respondent, most cases decided 
are limited to confessions, which require a court to conduct a trial-within-a 
trial before the confession is admitted.159 The Court stated that the mode of 
arrest and the requirements for search certificates needed to be re-
examined.160 The Court relied on the cogency of other evidence and a 
consideration of whether it was sufficient to sustain a conviction. The 
evidence would not, however, be sufficiently substantial to sustain a 
conviction where the mode of acquiring it involved the use of duress to 
compel witnesses to sign search certificates. It was prudent to establish the 
process of conducting the search, acquiring the evidence, and signing of 
the search certificate. If this process had been tainted by human rights 
violations, the Court had to determine whether the violation of third party 
rights would affect the admission of the prosecution's evidence.161 The 
illegality involved in procuring the search certificate and the violation of the 
accused's right to dignity162 were upheld by the Court in allowing the 
accused's appeal. Since courts are becoming cognisant of the use of 
entrapment and showing their distaste for is, it is only proper that 
entrapment should be regulated. While the Court took issue with the use of 
traps, it neither offered solutions nor held that it was improper to admit the 
evidence. The Court neither used the protection theory nor clearly 
embraced the reliability theory.  
The practice of setting police traps is an unusual crime prevention strategy 
based predominantly upon deceptive law enforcement techniques,163 and it 
needs to be regulated. In jurisdictions like South Africa entrapments are 
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regulated by statute.164 This is not the case in Uganda. There are instances 
where the police go beyond providing an opportunity for the commission of 
an offence. The Courts recognise traps as an aid to the arrest of suspects,165 
and the human rights violations that accompany them.166 They need to be 
regulated and streamlined so that the constitutional values and aspirations 
of the Constitution are upheld. 
This article shows that the status of the evidence obtained through human 
rights violations is a significant question in the light of the legislative 
framework and the judicial development of jurisprudence. The Constitution 
is silent on how the courts should deal with evidence obtained through 
human rights violations. It does create a working framework for the 
enforcement of the right to a fair hearing for an accused person, but fails to 
secure strict observance of this right in so far as it is silent on how to deal 
with evidence obtained through human rights violations. The lack of 
provisions in criminal procedure legislation exacerbates the situation. A few 
Uganda cases have adequately grappled with this issue. These include 
Kalawudio, Ssewankambo, Walugembe, Besigye and Ssekabira. The other 
cases have not deal with this issue adequately. Before a conclusion is 
drawn and recommendations are made, a brief examination will be 
undertaken of the South African approach to evidence obtained through 
human rights violations in the belief that this will contribute to the value of 
the conclusions drawn. 
5 The South African approach 
South Africa has a constitutional provision dealing with evidence obtained 
through human rights violations and a wealth of case law for the purpose of 
interpreting the provision. The Constitution of 1996 provides that: 
Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must 
be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or 
otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice.167 
From the wording of section 35(5), there is a need to evaluate the manner 
in which evidence is obtained, the nature of the right in the Bill of Rights that 
is affected, and the two legs of the test for inclusion or exclusion of the 
evidence. The two legs of the test are the fairness of the trial and the 
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administration of justice. This section presumes that the evidence is 
admissible, unless it renders a trial unfair or is detrimental to the 
administration of justice.168 There is no similar provision in the Uganda 
Constitution to offer courts a directive on how to deal with such evidence.  
The evidence should not be obtained in a manner that violates any right in 
the Bill of Rights. The major situations relevant to this provision include 
cases of pointing-out, where the accused is not informed of his or her rights 
before the pointing-out,169 illegal searches,170 illegal surveillance,171 autoptic 
evidence,172 and evidence obtained through the improper treatment of 
witnesses.173 Therefore, in instances of the violation of statutory rights, the 
common law exclusionary rule or the application of judicial discretion may 
be used.174 The distinction between the common law exclusionary rule and 
the rule under section 35(5) is that, unlike the latter, the former applies to all 
cases, and not only criminal cases.175 Unlike section 35(5), which requires 
a court to subject evidence that has been obtained through human rights 
violations to the test set therein, the common law exclusionary rule is a 
discretionary remedy that a judicial officer exercises if the admission of a 
given piece of evidence will operate unfairly against the accused.176 The 
exclusionary rule may apply even when there has been no violation of a 
human right; the presence of improperly obtained evidence without a human 
right violation may be sufficient for a court to invoke the exclusionary rule.177 
Some of the rights canvassed in the Bill of Rights include the right to 
freedom and security of the person,178 privacy,179 expression180 and 
movement, 181and a fair trial.182 The right to a fair trial is guaranteed by the 
provision of pre-hearing safeguards in the Constitution. These safeguards 
include an accused's right to be informed promptly of the charge against 
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him,183 the right to remain silent184 and the consequences of not remaining 
silent.185 These rights are also provided for in Uganda's Constitution.186 
Other guarantees are the right not to be compelled to make a confession or 
admission that could be used in evidence against an accused,187 the right 
to be brought to court within 48 hours,188 and the right to be presumed 
innocent till proven guilty.189 Where the safeguards are disregarded by the 
investigating authority while collecting evidence, a violation of the 
constitutional rights occurs. This consequently creates an enabling 
environment for the accused person to invoke the section. 
Unfairness of the trial is one of the grounds for the exclusion of evidence 
under the section. In S v Tandwa (Tandwa),190 the Court noted that some 
of the factors that may be grounds for the exclusion of evidence include the 
severity of the human rights violation, the degree of prejudice to the 
accused, the need to balance public policy on fighting crime and the 
interests of society, and the need to balance the due process of law against 
crime control. Therefore, where the conduct of the police is deliberate and 
flagrant,191 a court will be inclined not to admit the evidence, because it 
would render the trial unfair. In the view of the author, these grounds apply 
to both the unfairness of the trial and placing the administration of justice 
into disrepute. This is so because, although the Court in Tandwa held that 
the grounds listed are relevant in establishing the unfairness of the trial of 
the accused,192 they added that what is unfair to an accused will always be 
detrimental to the administration of justice.193 
Where the admission of the evidence brings the administration of justice 
into disrepute, then the evidence will not be admitted. In examining this 
ground, a court looks at factors like the presence of good faith on the part 
of law enforcement officers. In Soci the Court was reluctant to uphold the 
evidence obtained as a result of the failure of a police officer to perform the 
right procedure before the accused made a pointing out.194 Other factors 
which the courts consider include: the nature and seriousness of the 
                                            
183  Section 35(3)a of the RSA Constitution. 
184  Section 35(3)h of the RSA Constitution. 
185  Section 35(1)a of the RSA Constitution. 
186  Article 28(3) of the Constitution. 
187  Section 35(b)a of the RSA Constitution.  
188  Section 35(1)c of the RSA Constitution. 
189  Section 35(3)h of the RSA Constitution. 
190  S v Tandwa 2008 1 SACR 613 (SCA) (Tandwa) para 120. 
191  Tandwa para 128. Zeffert and Paizes South African Law of Evidence 741. 
192  Tandwa para 117. 
193  Tandwa para 118. 
194  S v Soci 1998 2 SACR 275 (E) 297a. 
RD NANIMA  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  22 
violation,195 urgency and public safety,196 the availability of other alternative 
means of obtaining the evidence in question,197and the deterrence or 
disciplinary factor to discourage police from using illegal methods.198 If the 
violation involves torture, the evidence is not admitted.199 
The Courts have added to the jurisprudence of section 35(5) through 
interpretation. They have dealt with the issue of a causal link between the 
violation of the right and the collection of evidence. While the casual link 
may vary in magnitude, this variance is not a condition that determines 
whether the evidence may be admitted. Its degree of severity is not a 
condition precedent to the determination of the admissibility of evidence. A 
court examines each case on its merits. In Tandwa the Court held that there 
is a high degree of prejudice when there is a close causal connection 
between the rights violation and the subsequent self-incriminating acts of 
the accused.200 In S v Orrie201the Court held that a weak causal link between 
the violation and the evidence would not render the evidence obtained 
through human rights violations inadmissible. In S v Mthembu202 the court 
held that where torture had irredeemably tainted the evidence of a third 
party, the subsequent voluntary testimony in court could not alter the fact 
that the evidence had been obtained through torture. In addition, evidence 
can be excluded when a third party's rights have been violated in the 
process of obtaining evidence against an accused.203 The above principles 
show that if the rigid rule on the use of the intensity of a causal link is used, 
judicial integrity and the purpose of the constitutional directive would be 
compromised. The position is different in Canada. Canadian courts do not 
require the presence of a causal link to justify the application of section 24(2) 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.204 The reason advanced 
is that the causal connection is too narrow and difficult to apply and its 
existence is therefore not determinative. This was a departure from the 
earlier position of the courts that required the presence of a causal link. This 
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position was subsequently confirmed in R v Brydges,205 where the Court 
held that section 24(2) would be used as long as a Charter violation 
occurred in the course of obtaining the evidence. 
The section is silent on whether an accused person has standing to bring 
an application under section 35(5), where the rights of a third party or a 
person other than the accused have been violated. The courts have held 
that an accused person can apply section 35(5), even where it 'is the rights 
of a third party that have been violated in obtaining evidence that 
incriminates the accused.206 A hypothetical situation to illustrate this is 
where the accused person, A, seeks to have the evidence obtained from B 
in violation of B's rights not to be admitted against A. This reinforces the 
policy behind the enactment of the section by ensuring that it is not only in 
instances where the accused's rights are violated that section 35(5) may be 
applied. A strict interpretation for that requirement would be inconsistent 
with the purpose of preventing the exclusion of evidence obtained through 
human rights violations.207 
In instances where evidence is obtained by third parties or vigilantes in 
violation of an accused's rights, it is subjected to section 35(5) before a court 
exercises its discretion to admit it. In S v Songezo Mini (Mini),208 the Court 
subjected the evidence obtained by security officers to section 35(5) 
scrutiny before admitting it, because the evidence had not been obtained by 
the police but by other law enforcement officers.209 The Court did not reject 
the evidence outright but rather subjected it to the test under section 35(5) 
and admitted only such evidence as passed that test.210 In instances where 
there had been a violation of the rights of the accused before the evidence 
was obtained, the evidence was not admitted. In instances where the 
violation of the rights of the accused persons had occurred after the 
evidence had been obtained, the evidence was admitted.211 In S v Hena212 
the Court held that section 35(5) covers situations where the police abdicate 
their statutory duty to investigate crimes by sub-contracting it to anti-crime 
committees who gather evidence by seriously and deliberately violating the 
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constitutional rights of an accused person. In S v Zuko213 the Court provided 
four factors which may form the basis for not admitting such evidence. 
These are: a lack of good faith on the part of vigilantes; the non-justification 
of their conduct on the basis of public safety or emergency concerns, the 
seriousness of the violation of the appellant's rights to privacy; the freedom 
and security of person and dignity; and the availability of lawful means to 
acquire the evidence. This approach enhances the right to a fair trial from 
the pre-trial stages.  
The answer to the question of who bears the burden of proof to establish 
that there has been a violation of rights in obtaining evidence is not clear in 
South Africa. While two decisions have varying views on the matter, a 
textual reading of the section requires the state to bear the burden. In 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Viljoen (Viljoen)214 the Court 
held that the accused has to show a violation of his or her rights before it 
makes a decision on whether to admit the evidence.215 In other words, the 
accused should prove a violation of a right as a threshold requirement to the 
application of section 35(5). This meant that the accused had to violate his 
right against self-incrimination and the right to remain silent if it were to be 
proved that there had been a violation of his rights. Conversely, in S v 
Mgcina (Mgcina)216 the Court placed the burden on the prosecution to 
disprove that the evidence had been obtained in an unconstitutional 
manner.217 The Court seems to agree with the common law principle that it 
was for the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and not for the 
accused to prove his innocence.218 In the author's view, Viljoen was decided 
erroneously and cannot pass the constitutional test, because the accused's 
right to remain silent would be infringed. The case of Mgcina offers a 
purposive approach to the application of section 35(5). Schwikkard 
suggests two alternative solutions for the situation. First, the accused 
alleges a violation but need not prove that the evidence was obtained in 
violation of his or her constitutional rights.219 Second, in the course of 
holding a trial-within-a-trial a distinction is made between matters of fact as 
opposed to matters of judgment and value, which would point to the proof 
of guilt. The two alternatives enable a court to establish the existence of the 
factual violation of the rights of an accused on a balance of probabilities, 
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without forming a value judgement. At this stage of the hearing, the court 
would not be concerned with the proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt but 
only with the admission of the evidence. 
The procedure used for the application of the exclusionary rule is a trial-
within-a- trial to test the admissibility of evidence. The application is made 
before the evidence is admitted.220 This is done when the accused objects 
to the admission of a piece of evidence. The reason for this procedure is to 
ensure that the accused can testify on the issue concerning the admissibility 
of the impugned evidence without exposing himself to cross-examination as 
to his guilt. In S v Ntzweli,221 it was held that the lower court's refusal to hold 
a trial-within-a-trial to determine the admissibility of the evidence obtained 
as a result of an illegal search amounted to a failure of justice.222 
6 Conclusion and recommendations 
The cases that have been discussed fall into three categories of 
jurisprudence. The first category involves a situation where a court admits 
the evidence obtained through human rights violations, as occurred in 
Namulobi. If the court is able to satisfy itself that admission of the evidence 
does not occasion an injustice to the accused person, it will admit the 
evidence. The yardstick for the admission of this evidence is the probative 
value of the evidence based on a judgment of its reliability. It follows that a 
court is more inclined to follow the reliability theory on the grounds that 
illegally obtained evidence may be as reliable as lawfully obtained evidence 
and may have a bearing on the innocence or guilt of an accused.223 This 
line of jurisprudence requires a court to hold that the reliability of the 
evidence is of greater importance than the protection of the accused's rights. 
This justification is done through the use of evidence that corroborates the 
evidence that points to the guilt of the accused.224 A court is more inclined 
to labour to distinguish the cases before handing down its judgement. In 
Namulobi, the court distinguished the facts in Edong v Uganda to justify its 
decision.225 In Edong, the appellant made two statements. In the first one, 
he denied any involvement in the murder, and in the second he volunteered 
information as regards the way he committed the murder. At the hearing of 
the case he denied the confession, claiming it was obtained through 
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coercion, and the court agreed. In addition, the confession was the only 
source of evidence, unlike the situation in Namulobi, where there was 
evidence of the appellant's voluntary co-operation with the police to recover 
items of the victim, and confessions to various witnesses as to how he 
committed the offence.226 Unlike Edong, even if the confession in Namulobi 
were to eb expunged he would still be convicted on the other existing 
evidence.227 Finally, the holding in Namulobi shows that the court went to 
great lengths to show that there was no unfairness occasioned to the 
accused at his trial.  
The second category involves a situation where a Court has not admitted 
evidence obtained through human rights violations. This category forms the 
bulk of most of the cases, which include Kawaludio, Ssewankambo, Besigye 
and Ssekabira. It is important to note that in all these cases the Court rejects 
the admission of improperly obtained evidence on the grounds that its 
admission would be against the aspirations of the Constitution,228 the trial 
court had not followed the procedure to ascertain the voluntariness of the 
confession,229 or the police had not followed the right procedure in recording 
the confessions,230 that the court would not sanction the continued 
prosecution of the accused where there was a violation of their rights to a 
fair trial,231 that the yardstick for establishing whether the accused would 
have a fair trial was premised on whether a fair trial would be achieved in 
the circumstances of each case, or that the trial would be a waste of time 
and an abuse of the court process.232 Furthermore, the courts upheld the 
protective theory over the reliability theory,233 because the Constitution 
mandated it to do so and not to condone the excesses of the police.234 This 
line of jurisprudence was frequently evident in the period 1996 to 2014, and 
it was rooted in the need to uphold the ideals of the Constitution. The four 
cases of Kawaludio, Ssewankambo, Besigye and Ssekabira show an 
attempt by the courts to balance the fairness of a trial and at the same time 
not to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
The third category involved instances where a court would take issue with 
evidence obtained through human rights violations but did not offer any 
                                            
226  Namulobi 8. 
227  Namulobi 8. 
228  Kalawudio para 26. 
229  Ssewankambo 8; Walugembe 6. 
230  Ssewankambo 10; Walugembe 9. 
231  Besigye 38; Sekabira 7. 
232  Besigye 38. 
233  John and Sarah Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence 154. 
234  Kalawudio para 26; Besigye 38; Ssekabira 7. 
RD NANIMA  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  27 
recommendations or develop any jurisprudence to aid the otherwise 
dangerous situation. This was evident in Ekungu, where the Court took 
issue with the use of traps, yet at the same time did not indicate whether the 
evidence had been adequately adduced.235 In this category there was 
uncertainty and a lack of guidance where a Court identified a violation of the 
rights of third parties to incriminate the accused but did not offer direction.236 
Although the case of Ekungu was decided by the Anti-Corruption Division 
of the High Court under the new Anti-Corruption Act,237 it does not consider 
the need for a fair trial and the proper administration of justice. 
In the light of the three models of jurisprudence, it would be most appropriate 
for the courts to embrace the second model, which upholds the protection 
of the accused from the excesses of the investigative organs as much as 
possible. This model ensures fairness at a trial and that the administration 
of justice is not brought into disrepute. It seems to embrace section 35(5) of 
the South African Constitution in that it ensures that the constitutional rights 
of an accused are not trampled on. The first model would be appropriate 
where the probative value of the evidence outweighs the manner in which it 
was obtained and does not occasion an injustice to the accused person. 
This would technically mean that all evidence is presumed to be admissible 
until it is proved that it was obtained in a manner that violated the 
constitutional rights of an accused person. It is on this basis that the 
jurisprudence could grow systematically, since there would be a 
constitutional provision as a normative framework for continued growth and 
consistency. The Justice, Law and Order Sector (JLOS), a priority sector of 
government that co-ordinates the activities of the institutions that deal with 
justice, like the Judiciary, the DPP, and the police,238 could consult on the 
workability of a constitutional provision to deal with evidence obtained 
though human rights violations.  
To this end, therefore, the Constitution should be amended to provide for a 
directive on how to deal with evidence obtained through human rights 
violations. This should not be an instance of copying the contents of a 
Constitution from another jurisdiction. The Uganda Law Reform 
Commission in conjunction with other stakeholders should conduct a due 
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diligence study to establish what the contents of the amendment should be. 
It is proposed that the amendment should at least provide for a dual test of 
fairness of the trial and of the administration of justice. The test of public 
opinion might conflict with the administration of justice. The amendment 
could be placed after Article 50 of the Constitution, which provides for a right 
of redress. The principles of the need for a causal link, standing, and 
evidence procured by third parties should be left to the courts to develop as 
the amendment is applied. The amendment should have clarity to compel 
the exclusion of illegally or improperly obtained evidence in the form of 
information, statements and confessions provided that they do not render a 
trial unfair or are detrimental to the administration of justice. Chapter eight 
of the Constitution provides for the Courts of Judicature. The courts of 
record in Uganda's legal system should be empowered to develop the 
common law in instances where there is an apparent problem with the law, 
which cannot be solved. Apart from confessions, one of the problems 
exacerbating the admission of evidence obtained through human rights 
violations is the lack of a law to subject this evidence to a trial-within-a-trial 
to establish whether or not it was obtained voluntarily. The courts' ability to 
develop the common law will enable them to subject all issues of 
admissibility of evidence to a trial-within-a-trial. 
There should be the enactment of a DPP Act, to provide for the duties of a 
prosecutor to the accused, the victim and the court in instances where 
evidence is obtained through human rights violations. While the principles 
and guidelines on the right to a fair trial are applicable in Uganda, as a State 
Party to the African Charter, they are not reflected in any criminal procedure 
law. This diminishes the chances of their being used by conventional judicial 
officers who follow the law as it is written. 
The police should be compelled to stop using procedures that taint the 
voluntariness of an accused and other individuals to provide evidence. The 
procedure from arrest to the production of a person in court for plea should 
be streamlined to avoid human rights violations. Amendments to the 
Criminal Procedure Code Act should provide for the limitation of using 
entrapments to acquire evidence and should provide guidelines for the use 
of entrapments. This would enhance professionalism in investigations, while 
at the same time upholding human rights in the process. The Police Act 
could also be amended to provide for the obligations of investigators in the 
course of gathering evidence. This legislation would play a significant role 
in preventing human rights violations and procedural irregularities in the 
process of collecting evidence. 
RD NANIMA  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  29 
The courts should be dynamic in making decisions which enhance the 
jurisprudence relating to evidence obtained through human rights violations. 
There should be a shift from reliance on a procedural approach to a human 
rights approach in making decisions. The decisions made should reflect the 
need to uphold human rights as the first priority. The procedural aspects of 
the chain of investigations should be used to enhance a fair trial. There is a 
heavy reliance on the reliability theory of evidence. A shift to the use of the 
deterrent and protective theories should also be made. This would deter the 
police from committing human rights violations and protect accused persons 
being placed at an unfair disadvantage due to the conduct of the police. The 
burden of proof should be on the prosecution to prove that evidence was 
obtained without the violation of any of the rights of the accused. This would 
serve to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system by ensuring the 
presumption of innocence, the principle of legality, the protection of the right 
not to self- incriminate, and the right to remain silent.  
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